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Abstract—Steganography is the art and science of hiding secret
messages in public communication so that the presence of the
secret messages cannot be detected. There are two provably
secure steganographic frameworks, one is black-box sampling
based and the other is compression based. The former requires a
perfect sampler which yields data following the same distribution,
and the latter needs explicit distributions of generative objects.
However, these two conditions are too strict even unrealistic in
the traditional data environment, because it is hard to model the
explicit distribution of natural image. With the development of
deep learning, generative models bring new vitality to provably
secure steganography, which can serve as the black-box sampler
or provide the explicit distribution of generative media. Motivated
by this, this paper proposes two types of provably secure
stegosystems with generative models. Specifically, we first design
block-box sampling based provably secure stegosystem for broad
generative models without explicit distribution, such as GAN,
VAE, and flow-based generative models, where the generative
network can serve as the perfect sampler. For compression based
stegosystem, we leverage the generative models with explicit dis-
tribution such as autoregressive models instead, where the adap-
tive arithmetic coding plays the role of the perfect compressor,
decompressing the encrypted message bits into generative media,
and the receiver can compress the generative media into the
encrypted message bits. To show the effectiveness of our method,
we take DFC-VAE, Glow, WaveNet as instances of generative
models and demonstrate the perfectly secure performance of
these stegosystems with the state-of-the-art steganalysis methods.
Index Terms—Steganography, Generative Model, Arithmetic
Coding, Provable Security
I. Introduction
STEGANOGRAPHY is the art and science of commu-nicating in such a way that the presence of a mes-
sage cannot be detected. It has been be applied in various
applications, such as anonymous communication and covert
communication, by hiding message into media, such as text
[1], audio [2], image [3], [4], video [5], etc. Cachin [6] firstly
formalized an information-theoretic model for steganography
in 1998, where a relative entropy function is employed as a
basic measure of steganographic security for the concealment
system. The security of a steganographic system can be
quantified in terms of the relative entropy D (Pc ‖ Ps) between
the distributions of cover Pc and stego Ps, which yields
bound on the detection capability of any adversary. From
another perspective, Hopper et al. [7] formalized perfectly
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secure system based on computational-complexity, which is
immigrated from cryptography. The perfect security is defined
as a polynomial-time distinguisher that cannot distinguish the
cover and stego.
With the definition of steganographic security, provably se-
cure steganography has developed a lot in the past two decades
and can be divided into two frameworks: compression based
and black-box sampling based. Anderson et al. [8] observed
that cover can be compressed to generate a secret message, and
for embedding message, we can decompress it into stego. Le et
al. [9] constructed a provably secure steganography called P-
code based on arithmetic coding and it assumes that the sender
and receiver know the distribution of cover exactly. Sallee [10]
designed a compression based stegosystem for JPEG images
that assumes the Alternating Current (AC) coefficients in JPEG
images following Generalized Cauthy distribution, and the
receiver can estimate the distribution as well.
As for black-box sampling based stegosystem, Cachin [6]
proposed rejection-sampling to generate stego that looks like
cover. In detail, the stegosystem samples from the cover
distribution until it selects a document whose hash value
equals to message XOR k, where k is a session key both
parties derive from the shared secret key. Hopper [7] improved
Cachin’s method and generalized it to be applicable to any
distribution, which assumes it has sufficient entropy and can
be sampled perfectly based on prior history. Von Ahn et
al. [11] created public-key provably secure stegosystem and
chosen-stegotext attacks (SS-CSA). Lysyanskaya et al. [12]
analyzed the problem of imperfect sample by weakening
assumption, where the cover distribution is modeled as a
stateful Markov process. Zhu et al. [13] provided a more
general construction of secure steganography with one-way
permutation and unbiased sampler.
Nevertheless, these two types of steosystems are both not
effective and not feasible in the realistic traditional data
environment. For compression based systems, they need to
know the exact distribution of cover, which is too strict.
Because the complexity and dimensionality of covers formed
by digital media objects, such as natural audios, images and
videos, prevent us from modeling a complete distribution Pc of
cover. As for black-box sampling based system, the difficulty
is that the perfect sampler is hard to obtain, and the capacity
of the existing schemes is rather low.
With the development of deep learning, generative models
has obtained significant success in recent years and bring new
vitality to provably secure steganography. By approaching the
distribution of training datasets, they can generate diverse data
samples in the test stage. Prominent models include variational
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2auto-encoders (VAE) [14], [15], which maximize a variational
lower bound on the data log likelihood, generative adversarial
networks (GAN) [16], which employs an adversarial frame-
work to train a generative model that mimics the true transition
model, and auto-regressive models [17]–[19] and normalizing
flows [20] which train with maximum likelihood (ML), avoid-
ing approximations by choosing a tractable parameterization
of probability density.
For VAE, GAN, and flow-based generative models, they can
generate vivid objects from latent variables, which follow a
prior distribution, e.g. normal distribution. For auto-regressive
models, they can give explicit distribution of generative objects
instead. These properties solve the difficulties in the tradi-
tional data environment, showing a new direction of designing
provably secure steganography. Note that, though generative
models have been utilized for steganography in some recent
works [21]–[23], most of them do not focus on provably secure
steganography.
In this paper, we design provably secure stegosystems on
generative models, which owns the advantages of efficiency,
practicality and high capacity. As for VAE, GAN and flow-
based models, since they cannot provide implicit distribution
of generative media but can be seen as perfect black-box
samplers, so they can be leveraged to design black-box-sample
based stegosystems. In detail, the encrypted message following
uniform distribution is mapped into the latent vector which
follows normal distribution first, and then the latent vector is
fed to the generative component, yielding the generative data.
To extract messages, another neural network whose structure
is similar to the discriminator in GAN or encoder in VAE
should be trained. For flowed-based generative models, thanks
to their inherent reversible structures, they can directly recover
message from generated data. If the parameters of generative
models are kept unchanged, feeding the latent vector following
the specified distribution (e.g., normal distribution), the distri-
bution of the generated data will be same thus guarantee the
perfect security. In the experiment part, DFC-VAE and Glow
are taken as the realizations for building the stegosystem, and
steganalytic analysis is further used to verify the final secure
performance.
When it comes to auto-regressive models, since they can
express tractable distribution of generative data, which meets
the requirement of compression based stegosystem. Therefore,
compression based stegosystem are adopted for these models.
In this paper, we use one of most representative generative
model (i.e., WaveNet) as an example to construct the system.
This model is originally designed to synthesize high quality
audios, and the semantic of generated audios is very robust.
Specifically, to build the system, we combine arithmetic coding
into the generation process. In the sender end, it decompresses
the encrypted message into audio samples following the given
distribution predicted by WaveNet. Then the receiver can
reproduce the same probability distribution as that in the
sender end with the same generative model. Finally, by feeding
the distribution and the stego, the message can be extracted
by the encoder of arithmetic coding. In the following part, we
will provide the theoretical analysis of the stegosystem using
arithmetic coding to prove the perfect security.
Emb(·) Ext(·)Cover c
Key k
Message m Message m
Key k
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Fig. 1. A diagram of steganographic communication.
To sum up, the main contributions of this work are three-
fold:
• We introduce VAEs, GANs and flow-based generative
models for black-box sampling based provably secure
steosystems.
• Based on auto-regressive generative model WaveNet, we
design the compression based provably secure stegosys-
tem. Benefit from the robustness of the semantics of
audio, the receiver can resume the generative process
without additional information. Theoretical analysis is
also given to prove the perfect security.
• Extensive experiments demonstrate the perfect security
proposed stegosystems by defending against the state-
of-the-art steganalytic methods. Most of the proposed
stegosystems show perfect secure performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review the
related work in Section II, and the proposed provably secure
stegosystem based on different kinds of generative models
are elaborated in Section III and Section IV respectively. The
experiments are presented in Section V. Conclusion and future
work are given in Section VI.
II. Related Work
A. The Prisoners’ Problem
In order to improve the readability of this paper, the prison-
ers’ problem [24] formulated by Simmons is first introduced,
which is a simple simulation on the background of steganogra-
phy - Alice and Bob are imprisoned in separate cells and want
to hatch an escape plan. They are allowed to communicate but
their communication is monitored by warden Eve. If Eve finds
out that the prisoners are secretly exchanging the messages,
she will cut the communication channel and throw them into
solitary confinement.
B. The Diagram of Steganography
According to the prisoners’ problem, the diagram of the
steganography is depicted in Fig. 1. A steganographic scheme
can be regarded as a pair of embedding and extraction func-
tions Emb() and Ext() for Alice and Bob, respectively [25].
Emb(c,k,m) = s, (1)
Ext (s) = m, (2)
where c,k,m, s are cover object, secret key, message and stego
object, respectively. Eve judges the object s is innocent or not
by all the possible knowledge except secret key according to
Kerckhoffs’ principle [26].
3Message Intent vector G/Decoder Generated data Extractor Intent vector Message
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Fig. 2. The pipeline of black-box sample based provably secure steganography using VAE or GAN.
C. The Theoretical Definition of Steganographic Security
The theoretical definition of steganographic security is given
by Cathin [6] with the information theory. Assuming the cover
is drawn from C with probability distribution Pc and the
steganographic method will generate stego object which has
the distribution Ps. The distance of two distributions can be
measured using relative entropy:
D (Pc ‖ Ps) =
∑
x∈C
Pc (x) log
Pc (x)
Ps (x)
. (3)
When D (Pc ‖ Ps) = 0, the stegosystem is perfectly secure.
D. Existing Provably Secure Stegosystem
The black-box sampling based provably secure stegosystem
can be briefly described in Algorithm 1. Given a mapping
function fk(·) : K × C → R with the secret key k and R =
{0, 1}e, the message embedding in the stegosystem is based
on rejection sampling algorithm SampleCf (k, b). The algorithm
can sample cover following the given distribution C by oracle
OC, such that an e-bit symbol b will be embedded in it. The
algorithm randomly chooses a sample s until fk(s) = b, where
←R denotes the random choosing of oracle O. Nevertheless,
the perfect samplers for multimedia are hard to obtain in
the traditional data environment, and the capacity of existing
schemes, such as adopting document, network protocol [27]
as the carrier, is rather low, e.g. one document carries 1
bit message. In addition, there seems no black-box sampling
based perfectly secure steganography for multimedia.
Algorithm 1 SampleCf (k, b)
Require: a key k, a value b ∈ {0, 1}e
1: repeat
2: s←R OC
3: until fk(s) = b
4: Return s
Based on arithmetic coding, Le et al. [9] proposed P-
code for provably secure steganography, which requires both
sides know the distribution of cover exactly. Sallee [10]
designed the compression-based stegosystem for JPEG images
by assuming Alternating Current (AC) coefficients follow
Generalized Cathin distribution. However, the complexity and
dimensionality of covers formed by digital media objects, such
as natural audios, images and videos, will prevent us from
determining a complete distribution Pc of cover, which implies
Sallee’s method cannot achieve perfectly secure.
In summary, compression-based schemes need to know the
exact distribution of cover, which is too difficult to capture
the distribution of digital media objects. As for black-box-
sample based system, the perfect sampler are hard to obtain,
and the capacity of the existing schemes is rather low. To
this end, we introduce the generative models into provably
secure steganography which can serve as the perfect sampler,
or supply the explicit probability distribution of cover object,
so that the provably secure stegosystem can be practical and
effective.
E. Generative Models
Generative model describes how media are generated, in
terms of a probabilistic model. The generation process can
be seen as random sampling from the probability distribution
learned in the stage of training, as shown in Fig. 3. The
generative models can be divided into two categories, implicit
density probability distribution and explicit density probability
distribution. VAEs, GANs and flow-based models belong to
the first category, and auto-regressive models attribute to the
second category. The former meets the requirement of the
black-box sampling based stegosystem, while the latter is able
to be adopted to develop compression based stegosystem.
In the subsequent sections, we will design provably secure
stegosystem on different generative models.
Generative model
Training data distribution
Sample
  Random sampling 
PDF of the generative distribution
PDF
Fig. 3. The pipeline of sample generation using generative model.
III. Provably Secure Steganography on Generative Model
Without Explicit Probability Distribution
VAEs, GANs and flow-based models do not own explicit
probability distribution, however, the generative components
in their models can serve as the perfect black-box sampler,
which generate media with the same distribution. The black-
box sampling based provably secure stegosystem can be built
on them. Details will be expanded below.
4A. Provably Secure Stegosystem Using VAE / GAN
VAE includes encoder and decoder. To generate a sample
from the model, the VAE first draws a sample z from the prior
distribution pθ(z). The sample z is used as input to a differ-
entiable generator network g(z). Finally, x is sampled from
a distribution pθ(x|g(z)) = pθ(x|z). During the training, the
approximate inference network, i.e., encoder network qφ(z|x)
is used to obtain z and pθ(x|z) is viewed as a decoder network.
GAN is one of the most popular generative deep models.
The core of a GAN is to play a min-max game between a
discriminator D and a generator G, i.e., adversarial training.
The discriminator D tries to differentiate if a sample is from
real-world or generated by the generator while the generator G
tries to generate samples that can fool the discriminator. The
generator takes a noise z sampled from a prior distribution
p(z) as input, and maps the noise to the data space as Gθg (z).
Typical choices of the prior p(z) can be uniform distribution
or Gaussian distribution. Dθd (x) is the classifying network that
outputs a single scalar which represents the probability that x
comes from the real-world data rather than generated data.
Once the parameters of the generative components in
VAE/GAN are determined, the generative data will follow the
same distribution, which meets the requirement of the perfect
sampler. As a result, they can be adopted to design black-box
sampling based stegosystem. The pipeline of the stegosystem
building on VAE or GAN is presented in Fig. 2.
First, we map the message into latent vectors, and then feed
the latent vector z to a pretrained decoder/generator, which will
yield generated stego y. Generally, the message is encrypted
first, so the encrypted message follows uniform distribution.
In VAE or GAN, the latent vectors are constrained to follow
normal distribution. Then the mapping module is used to map
uniform distribution to normal distribution. Here, we define
payload p as the information that each dimension of latent
vector carrying. Given p bits of message, we can map it into
a random noise using mapping function M(m, p):
z =M(m, p) = RS
(
Norm.ppf
( m
2p−1
)
,Norm.ppf
(
m + 1
2p−1
))
,
(4)
where the RS(x, y) is a reject sampling function that will keep
randomly sampling a value z from (−∞,∞) until z dropping
into the interval (x, y). m is the secret message in p-ary form
transferred from p bits binary message, and Norm.ppf(·) is
the percent point function (inverse of Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF)) of normal distribution, which can be used to
keep the CDF is average divided. Fig. 4 gives the example
of the interval division of p = 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively. The
bigger the interval is, the easier extracting message is. After the
division is determined, reject sampling is utilized to mapping
the binary stream into the corresponding interval. Details of
the mapping process are given in Algorithm 2. The module of
mapping reconstructed latent vectors z′ to message m′ is the
reverse process of Algorithm 2.
An extra extractor E will be trained to extract the message
from the stego, denoted by z′ = E(y) and the extractor E will
be sent to receiver before covert communication. The structure
of extractor can be similar to the encoder/discriminator with a
slight adjustment in the output layer, e.g. setting the dimension
of output of the fully connected layer as the dimension of latent
vector. The objective function LE of the extractor can be set
as the mean square error between the original latent vector z
and the reconstructed latent vector z′:
LE = ‖z′ − z‖2. (5)
Receivers use the extractor network to translate the generated
stego into reconstructed latent vectors z′ and map z′ into
reconstructed message m′ using Demodulator, the inverse
process of Modulator.
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Fig. 4. The examples of division in the module of mapping.
Algorithm 2 Mapping function M
Require: Payload p, message m of length n
Ensure: latent vectors v
1: Divide the interval (-∞,∞) into 2p subintervals according
to the CDF of Uniform distribution.
2: Make every p bits message as one group and compose np
message groups G.
3: for each item i in G do
4: repeat
5: Sample s from Uniform distribution.
6: until s drops into the corresponding interval of item i.
7: Append s to latent vectors z
8: end for
Since the GAN and VAE share the similar framework,
in implementation, we only take Deep Feature Consistent
Variational Autoencoder (DFC-VAE) [28] as a representative.
The structure and the initiation of Extractor are set the same
as the encoder in DFC-VAE, the training of Extractor is
independent of Encoder and Decoder. In other words, the VAE
can be pretrained to generate images.
B. Provably Secure Stegosystem Using Flow-based Generative
Models
There exists a type of generative model owning the property
of reversibility, which is also called flow-based generative
5model, such as i-ResNet [29], Glow [20]. In most flow-based
generative models, the generative process is defined as:
z ∼ pθ(z), (6)
x = gθ(z), (7)
where z is the latent variables and pθ has a tractable den-
sity, such as a spherical multivariate Gaussian distribution:
pθ(z) = N(z; 0, I). gθ is invertible, such that given a datapoint
x, latent-variable inference is done by z = fθ(x) = g−1θ (x).
The flow-based generative models have achieved considerable
visual quality in field of generating images. Since flow-based
generative models are reversible, it is very convenient to
convert them into steganographic frameworks. The pipeline
of stegosystem using flow-based generative model can be
expressed as:
m
M−→ z gθ−→ x g
−1
θ−−→ z′ M
−1
−−−→ m′. (8)
The message m is first mapped into latent vector z, then z is
fed into generative function gθ to obtain the generated stego x.
The receiver reconstructs the latent variable z′ using g−1θ , and
uses the reverse process of mapping to reconstruct message
m′.
Reversibility means the reconstructed latent vector z′ is
same as the original latent vector z. Always the mapping func-
tion M is invertible as well. Consequently, the message can
be losslessly extracted if the communication channel is noise-
free. Unlike the aforementioned framework, this work does not
require an extra extractor for it is reversible, which brings great
convenience to us. Furthermore, since the process is reversible,
the payload will not affect the accuracy of message extraction.
Consequently, the capacity of this framework can reach as big
as the file size of image. In our default implementation, Glow
is selected as the generative model.
C. Discussion of the Security
After the training phase, the DFC-VAE and Glow can
generate images from latent vector with normal distribution.
For innocent users, a random latent vector following nor-
mal distribution will be fed to the generative component
for generating images. Since the generative component are
kept unchanged after training, if the steganographer maps
the message into latent vector with normal distribution, the
distribution of the generated images will be the same as that
generated by innocent users. Consequently, the perfect security
can be achieved. It is worth mentioning that the steganographer
pursues the distribution of their stego images are identical
to that of the ordinary generated images rather than natural
images.
IV. Provably Secure Steganography on Generative Models
With Explicit Probability Distribution
The compression based stegosystem can be seen as gen-
erative steganography, which decompresses the message into
stego, and can be seen as the dual problem of source coding.
Given a perfect compressor, the media can be compressed
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Fig. 5. The diagram of generative steganography using WaveNet and Arith-
metic Coding.
into bits with the max entropy (following uniform distri-
bution in other words.). The inverse process is decompress
uniform bits into media, which coincidentally is similar to
the message embedding process, since the message is always
encrypted first. Then the perfect security depends on two
aspects: perfect compressor and knowing the distribution of
the media. There exist many kinds of source coding, such
as Huffman codes, Lempel-Ziv codes and Arithmetic coding,
asymptotically achieving the theoretical bound. As a result, the
tricky problem is that the distribution of natural signal is hard
to capture. Luckily, the auto-regressive models with explicit
density probability distribution can overcome the problem.
Autoregressive generative models over high-dimensional
data x = (x1, . . . , xn) factor the joint distribution as a product
of conditionals:
p(x) = p (x1, . . . , xn) =
n∏
i=1
p (xi|x1, . . . , xi−1) . (9)
Optionally, the model can condition on additional global
information h (audio semantic), in which case the conditionals
become p (xi|x1:i−1,h). With the explicit probability distribu-
tion of the cover object, the source coding can be combined
into the generative process for decompressing the message
into generated data. Given generated data, if the receivers can
repeat the generated process to obtain the probability distribu-
tion, they can compress the generated data into message.
A. Provably Secure Stegosystem Using WaveNet
In the previous work [30], provably secure steganography
on image synthesis using autogressive models was presented
and shown impressive performance. To extend this work,
we design provably secure steganography scheme on audio
synthesis system with WaveNet. Audio synthesis has natural
advantage in this field. The quality of synthesis speech is
close to human speech [19], and can be easily recognized by
speech-to-text system. Furthermore, the system is based on the
conditional autogressive models. With different input words,
the system can generate the corresponding audio, which means
the diversity and the certainty of this system are better than
those of the previous work [30].
The whole diagram of the stegosystem is shown in Fig. 5.
At the sender-end, given the input text, the mel-spectrogram
can be predicted by the Spectrogram Prediction Network
6(SPN). As for ordinary waveform generation, the sample is
randomly chosen according to the distribution p(xt), where
the distribution is yielded by the WaveNet vocoder. In detail,
the probability of the second sample p (x2 | x1,h) is produced
by the WaveNet with the mel-spectrogram. As for ordinary
waveform generation, the value of the second sample x2 is
randomly chosen according to p (x2 | x1,h). Given x1, x2, the
probability distribution of x3 is predicted by the network
as p (x3 | x1, x2,h), similar process will be repeated until all
samples are generated.
When it comes to steganography, the message embedding
process is integrated with the waveform generation in WaveNet
vocoder. Since the generation is a sequential generation, adap-
tive arithmetic decoding (AAD) is utilized to embed message.
Given p(y2 | y1,h) (same as p(x2 | x1,h)), and message m,
a part of message can be embedded and obtained y1 using
AAD. Then the probability will be updated as p (y3 | y2, y1,h).
Analogously, the process will be repeated until all samples
are generated. The whole process of message embedding is
denoted as:
y = AAD (p (y | h) ,m) . (10)
where p (y | h) represents the probability distribution of y.
The process is also named AAD-WaveNet, labeled in Fig. 5.
To point out, the message length should be shorter than the
entropy of p (y | h). For simplicity, the message length L will
be set as different multiples of a constant value, so that L is not
required to send to the receiver. If the real message does not
reach the length, just padding 0 to message before encryption.
Before the covert communication, the sender should send SPN
and WaveNet vocoder to the receiver, or use public models and
just tell the receiver where to download.
The receiver utilizes speech-to-text tool such as DeepSpeech
[31], to recognize speech into text. It is worth mentioning that,
the recognition is not perfect, so the sender must verify the
generated audio can be correctly recognized before communi-
cation. Since owning the same model, y and message length L,
the probability distribution p(y) of every step will be identical
to that generated in the sender-end, so the message can be
extracted using adaptive arithmetic encoding (AAE), denoted
by:
m = AAE (p (y | h) , y) . (11)
The details of message embedding and extraction using AAD
and AAE will be elaborated below.
B. Message Embedding and Extraction
Given the distribution Pc of generative media, the process
of embedding message corresponds to source decoding, and
extraction corresponds to source encoding. A = {a1, a2, ..., am}
is the alphabet for a generative cover in a certain order with
the probability P = {P(a1), P(a2), ..., P(am)}. The cumulative
probability of a symbol can be defined as
F (ai) =
i∑
k=1
P (ak) . (12)
Owning these notations, we start to introduce the process of
message embedding and extraction.
1) Message embedding: Here, adaptive arithmetic decoding
(AAD) is selected as the source coding. Given the encrypted
message m = [m1m2m3...mL], it can be interpreted as a fraction
q in the range [0, 1) by prepending “0.” to it:
m1m2m3...mL → q = 0.m1m2m3...mL =
L∑
i=1
mi · 2−i. (13)
Following the adaptive arithmetic decoding algorithm, we start
from the interval [0, 1) and subdivide it into the subinterval
[l, l+h) according to the probability P of the symbols inA, and
then append the symbol a j corresponding to the subinterval in
which the dyadic fraction q lies into the stego y:
y = y :: a j, (14)
where :: represents appending the subsequent symbol into the
previous vector. Regularly, the probability P of symbols will
be updated. Then calculate the subinterval [l, h) according to
the updated probability P by
hk = lk−1 + (hk−1 − lk−1) ∗ F(a j), (15)
lk = lk−1 + (hk−1 − lk−1) ∗ F(a j−1), (16)
where hk and lk are the bound of subinterval in the k-th step.
Repeat the process until the fraction q satisfies the constraint:{
q + (0.5)L < [lk, hk)
q − (0.5)L < [lk, hk) (17)
This constraint guarantees that the dyadic fraction q is the
unique fraction of length L in the interval [lk, hk), such that
the message can be extracted correctly. The message length L
and the probabilities P of symbol are shared with the receiver.
To further clarify the scheme of message embedding using
arithmetic decoding, we provide a pseudo-code that describes
the implementation of message embedding by adaptive arith-
metic decoding in Appendix.
2) Message extraction: Correspondingly, the message ex-
traction refers to adaptive arithmetic encoding (AAE). On
the receiver-end, the interval [l, h) starts from [0, 1), and will
be subdivided into subintervals of length proportional to the
probabilities of the symbols. if k-th element y j corresponds to
the symbol a j, update the subinterval as follows:
hk = lk−1 + (hk−1 − lk−1) ∗ F(a j), (18)
lk = lk−1 + (hk−1 − lk−1) ∗ F(a j−1), (19)
Repeat the process until the number of steps reaches the length
of y. Finally, find the fraction q =
∑n
i=1 mi2
−i satisfying ln ≤
q ≤ hn, where mi ∈ {0, 1} is the message bit and n is the
length of message. Analogously, the pseudo code of message
extraction is presented in Appendix.
C. A Simple Example of Message Embedding and Extraction
Using AAD and AAE
Fig. 6 presents an example of embedding message using
AAD. Given the encrypted message m = (m j)L, and the
cover distribution Pc = (pi)n, we will implement embedding
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Appendix
Arithmetic coding [34] is a form of entropy encoding used
in lossless data compression. The key idea is encoding the
entire message into a single number, an arbitrary-precision
fraction q between 0 and 1. The initial interval is set as
[0, 1). Successive symbols of the message reduce the size
of the interval in accordance with the symbol probability
tables. Finally, an appropriate fraction q is selected in the final
interval [a, b) and then it is converted into binary form as the
encoding result. The decoded data matches the original data
as long as the probability table in decoding is replaced in
the same way and in the same step as in encoding. In actual
application, the probability table of the symbols often changes
while processing the data, so adaptive arithmetic coding [28]
is proposed.
In our proposed system, the case is similar to the adaptive
arithmetic coding, with only a litter in difference. On the
sending side, we adopt adaptive arithmetic decoding(AAD) to
decode the given message m = (m j)n based on the changing
probability table P′ = (p j)N . On the receiving side, we adopt
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adaptive arithmetic encoding(AAE) to restore the original
secret message. To make it easier to understand, we elaborate
the process with a simple example.
Firstly, we show adaptive arithmetic decoding: M j =
AAD(m, p′j). Suppose we get m = 010 and P
′ = (p′1, p
′
2, p
′
3),
with each p′j as follows:
p′1 = (0.40, 0.10, 0.50),
p′2 = (0.25, 0.25, 0.50),
p′3 = (0.50, 0.25, 0.25).
(32)
Given m = (010), the corresponding fraction q is calculated
as 0.25. The initial interval is set as [0, 1). Given p′1 =
(0.40, 0.10, 0.50), the three candidate intervals(for M j to be
0, 1 and 2 respectively) is as follows:
I0 = [0, 0.4), I1 = [0.4, 0.5), I2 = [0.5, 1.0). (33)
As q ∈ I0, we get M1 = 0 and update the interval as [0, 0.4).
Then we input p′2 = (0.25, 0.25, 0.50) and get the the three
candidate intervals:
I0 = [0, 0.1), I1 = [0.1, 0.2), I2 = [0.2, 0.4). (34)
As q ∈ I2, we get M2 = 2 and update the interval as [0.2, 0.4).
Then we input p′3 = (0.50, 0.25, 0.25) and get the the three
candidate intervals:
I0 = [0.2, 0.3), I1 = [0.3, 0.35), I2 = [0.35, 0.4). (35)
Fig. 6. The process of embedding message using adaptive arithmetic decoding
(AAD).
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Appendix
Arithmetic coding [34] is a form of entropy encoding used
in lossless data compres ion. The k y idea is encoding the
entire message into a single number, an arbitrary-precision
fraction q between 0 and 1. The initial interval is set as
[0, 1). Successive symbols of the message reduce the size
of the interval in accordance with the symbol probability
tables. Finally, an appropriate fraction q is selected in the final
interval [a, b) and then it is converted into binary form as the
encoding result. The decoded data matches the original data
as long as the probability table in decoding is replaced in
the same way and in the same step as in encoding. In actual
application, the probability table of the symbols often changes
while processing the data, so adaptive arithmetic coding [28]
is proposed.
In our proposed system, the case is similar to the adaptive
arithmetic coding, with only a litter in difference. On the
sending side, we adopt adaptive arithmetic decoding(AAD) to
decode the given message m = (m j)n based on the changing
probability table P′ = (p j)N . On the receiving side, we adopt
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Fig. 10: The process of adaptive arithmetic encoding(AAE). Given M = (020),
p′1 = (0.40, 0.10, 0.50), p
′
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′
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adaptive arithmetic encoding(AAE) to restore the original
secret message. To make it easier to understand, we elaborate
the process with a simple ex mple.
Firstly, e show adaptive arithmetic decoding: M j =
AAD(m, p′j). Suppose we get m = 010 and P
′ = (p′1, p
′
2, p
′
3),
with each p′j as follows:
p′1 = (0.40, 0.10, 0.50),
p′2 = (0.25, 0.25, 0.50),
p′3 (0.50, 0.25, 0.25).
(32)
Given m = (010), the corresponding fraction q is calculated
as 0.25. The initial interval is set as [0, 1). Given p′1 =
(0.40, 0.10, 0.50), the three candidate intervals(for M j to be
0, 1 and 2 respectively) is as follows:
I0 = [0, 0.4), I1 = [0.4, 0.5), I2 = [0.5, 1.0). (33)
As q ∈ I0, we get M1 = 0 and update the interval as [0, 0.4).
Then we input p′2 = (0.25, 0.25, 0.50) and get the the three
candidate intervals:
I0 = [0, 0.1), I1 = [0.1, 0.2), I2 = [0.2, 0.4). (34)
As q ∈ I2, we get M2 = 2 and update the interval as [0.2, 0.4).
Then we input p′3 = (0.50, 0.25, 0.25) and get the the three
candidate intervals:
I0 = [0.2, 0.3), I1 = [0.3, 0.35), I2 = [0.35, 0.4). (35)
Fig. 7. The process of message extraction using adaptive arithmetic encoding
(AAE).
by y = AAD(m,Pc). Suppose we get m = [0, 1, 0] and
Pc = [p1, p2, p3] with each p j as follows:
p1 = (0.40, 0.10, 0.50)
p2 = (0.25, 0.25, 0.50)
p3 = (0.50, 0.25, 0.25)
(20)
Transfer the message m = [0, 1, 0] into fraction q = 0.25. The
initial interval is set as [0, 1). Given p1 = (0.40, 0.10, 0.50), the
three candidate intervals (for yi to be 0, 1 and 2 respectively)
is as follows:
I0 = [0, 0.4), I1 = [0.4, 0.5), I2 = [0.5, 1.0). (21)
As q ∈ I0, Alice gets y1 = 0 and updates the interval as
[0, 0.4). Then given p2 = (0.25, 0.25, 0.50), the subintervals
can be obtained as:
I0 = [0, 0.1), I1 = [0.1, 0.2), I2 = [0.2, 0.4). (22)
As q ∈ I2, Alice gets y2 = 2 and updates the interval
as [0.2, 0.4). Thereafter, the new subintervals are divided
according to p3 = (0.50, 0.25, 0.25):
I0 = [02, 0.3), I1 = [0.3, 0.35), I2 = [0.35, 0.4). (23)
On the receiver-end, we use adaptive arithmetic encoding
m = AAE(y,P), as shown in Fig. 7. The parameters of the
generative model is shared with the receiver, so the receiver
can obtain the cover’s distribution Pc. Given y, message length
L, and the initial interval [0, 1), Bob first divide the interval
according to P1 in Equation (20). Due to y1 = 0, we update the
interval as [0,0.4). Given p2 = (0.25, 0.25, 0.50) and y2 = 2, we
update the interval as [0.2,0.3). Given p3 = (0.50, 0.25, 0.25)
and y3 = 0. we get the final interval as [0.2,0.3). The final
interval contains only a fraction whose binary form is L = 3
bits, denoted by q = 0.25. So we restore the original message
m = (010).
D. Proof of Asymptotically Perfect Security
The secure proof of using Arithmetic coding is discussed
in the subsection. The arithmetic code is prefix free, and by
taking the binary representation of q and truncating it to l (c) =
dlog 1P(c) e + 1 bits [32], we obtain a uniquely decodable code.
When it comes to encoding the entire sequence c, the number
of bits l(c) required to represent F(c) with enough accuracy
such that the code for different values of c are distinct is
l (c) = dlog 1
P (c)
e + 1. (24)
Remember that l (c) is the number of bits required to encode
the entire sequence c. Therefore, the average length of an
arithmetic code for a sequence of length n is given by
lAn =
∑
P(c)l(c)
=
∑
P(c)
[
l (c) = dlog 1
P (c)
e + 1
]
<
∑
P(c)
[
l (c) = log
1
P (c)
+ 1 + 1
]
= −
∑
P(c) log P (c) + 2
∑
P(c)
= H(Cn) + 2.
(25)
Given that the average length is always greater than the
entropy, the bounds on lAn are
H(Cn) ≤ lAn < H(Cn) + 2. (26)
The length per symbol lA, or rate of the arithmetic code is
lA(n)
n . Therefore, the bounds on lA are
H(Cn)
n
≤ lA < H(C
n)
n
+
2
n
. (27)
Also we know that the entropy of the sequence is nothing but
the length of the sequence times the average entropy of every
symbol [33]:
H (Cn) = nH(C). (28)
Therefore,
H (C) ≤ lA < H(C) + 2n . (29)
In our framework, Pns is the real distribution of n samples
generated by the process of message embedding using AAD,
and Pc is the target distribution which we are desired to
approximate. According to [34, Theorem 5.4.3], using the
wrong distribution Pns for encoding when the true distribution
is Pc incurs a penalty of D
(
Pc ‖ Pns
)
. In other words, the
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Fig. 8. The cover images and stego images generated by DFC-VAE stegosys-
tem.
increase in expected description length due to the approximate
distribution Pns rather than the true distribution Pc is the
relative entropy D
(
Pc ‖ Pns
)
. Directly extended from Eq. (29),
D
(
Pc ‖ Pns
)
has upper bound:
D
(
Pc ‖ Pns
)
<
2
n
, (30)
and if n→ ∞, then
D
(
Pc ‖ Pns
)→ 0. (31)
By increasing the length of the sequence, the relative
entropy between Pc and Pns turns to be 0, meaning that the
proposed steganographic scheme can asymptotically achieve
perfect security with sufficient elements using arithmetic cod-
ing.
V. Experiments
In this section, experimental results and analysis are pre-
sented to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the
proposed schemes.
A. DFC-VAE Stegosystem
Anime dataset which includes 50,000 color cartoon images
is selected as the dataset with cropping and scaling the aligned
images to 64×64 pixels like. We train the encoder and decoder
in DFC-VAE1 with a batch size of 64 for 150 epochs over
the training dataset and use Adam optimizer with an initial
learning rate of 0.0005, which is decreased by a factor of 0.5
for the following epochs. Thereafter, map the random message
into the latent vector z and feed z to the decoder to generate
stego image y. With the pair latent vectors and stego images,
the extractor can be trained with the same setting as encoder.
Quantitative Results and Visualization Fig.8 shows cover
samples and stego samples obtained by feeding random latent
vector and message-driven latent vector to DFC-VAE, respec-
tively. The state-of-the-art image steganalysis methods XuNet
[35] and SRNet [36] with a slight modification (modify input
channel from 1 to 3 for color images) are used to verify the
secure performance of proposed method. Testing error PE =
1
2 (PFA + PMD) is used to quantize the security performance,
1The source code can be downloaded at https://github.com/svenrdz/
DFC-VAE.
TABLE I
The testing error of DFC-VAE stegosystem versus different payloads.
Steganalysis Payload (bpp)1 2 3 4
XuNet [35] 0.4952 0.4968 0.4954 0.4944
SRNet [36] 0.4936 0.4942 0.4986 0.4949
(a) cover (b) stego
Fig. 9. The cover images and stego images generated by Glow stegosystem.
where PFA and PMD are the false-alarm probability and the
missed-detection probability respectively. 10,000 cover images
and 10,000 stego images for different payloads (1,2,3,4 bpp(bit
per pixel)) are generated for classifying.
Table I shows PE of DFC-VAE stegosystem, which are all
close to 0.5, meaning that the steganalyzer nearly randomly
judge that image is cover or stego. Namely, the DFC-VAE
stegosystem is nearly perfect secure. The performance of
steganalyzer varies from different datasets, to verify whether
the steganalysis methods are powerful, classifying different
distribution of this kind of images are added as control exper-
iment. The testing error rates of detecting images generated
by unbalance message (N0 : N1 = 1 : 2) are 0.15 and 0.10
by XuNet and SRNet, respectively, which shows validity of
steganalyzers. Accuracy of the secret message recovering has
also been explored, and the results are listed in Table III, It can
be seen that the larger payload is, the lower accuracy is. large
payload means small interval, results in bad fault tolerance.
B. Glow Stegosystem
Anime dataset also serves as the dataset, while due to the
limit computing resource, the images are resized to 32 × 32.
The architecture of Glow has a depth of flow K, and number
of levels L. Here, Glow model was trained with K = 10, L = 3,
a batch size of 64 for 300 epochs over the training dataset and
use Adam optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.0001.
Quantitative Results and Visualization Fig.9 shows cover
samples and stego samples obtained by Glow stegosystem.
Similar steganalytic experiments are carried out and the results
TABLE II
The testing error of Glow stegosystem versus different payloads.
Steganalysis Payload (bpp)1 2 3 4
XuNet [35] 0.4968 0.4945 0.4975 0.4986
SRNet [36] 0.4976 0.4954 0.4964 0.4990
9TABLE III
The message extraction accuracy of DFC-VAE stegosystem and Glow
stegosystem.
Extraction
Accuracy
Payload (bpp)
1 2 3 4
DFC-VAE stegosystem 97.3% 92.3% 82.87% 66.89%
Glow stegosystem 99.3% 99.1% 99.2% 99.2%
are shown in TableII. The Glow stegosystem are nearly perfect
safe, and the accuracy of message recovery approaches 100%,
which show superior to DFC-VAE stegosystem. The image
quality is not as good as that in [20], because the limited
computing resources require us to choose a simple neural
network structure. As shown in Table III, the accuracy rates
of the secret message recovering are nearly 100%, and are
independent of the message length, meaning that the capacity
of Glow stegosystem is large.
C. WaveNet Stegosystem
We randomly collect 1,000 short text sentences and transfer
them into mel-spectrograms using the SPN2 in Tacotron-2
[37]. Then WaveNet vocoder is used for audio waveform gen-
eration3. The WaveNet vocoder is trained on CMU ARCTIC
dataset [38] with 100,000 steps. All the audio clips are stored
in the uncompressed WAV format. The audio length ranges
from 0.5s to 3s, and the sample rate is 16kHz.
1) Steganalysis Features: The state-of-the-art steganalysis
features D-MC [39], the combined feature of Time-Markov
and Mel-Frequency (abbreviated as CTM) [40] are selected to
evaluate the secure performance. The detectors are trained as
binary classifiers implemented using the FLD ensemble with
default settings [41]. A separate classifier is trained for each
embedding algorithm and payloads. The ensemble by default
minimizes the total classification error probability under equal
priors:
PE = min
PFA
1
2
(PFA + PMD), (32)
The ultimate security is qualified by average error rate PE
averaged over ten 500/500 database splits, and larger PE means
stronger security.
We also realize other steganographic methods to show the
effectiveness of the selected steganalysis features. LSB match-
ing [42] and AACbased [43] algorithms are chosen, where the
former is the conventional and the latter is content-adaptive.
LSB matching means that if the message bit does not match
the LSB of the cover element, then one is randomly either
added or subtracted from the value of the cover pixel element.
Otherwise, there is no need for modification. AACbased
algorithm is simulated at its payload-distortion bound. The
distortion of AACbased is defined as the reciprocal of the
difference between the original audio and the reconstructed
audio through compression and decompression by advanced
audio coding.
2The architecture of spectrogram prediction network can be downloaded at
https://github.com/Rayhane-mamah/Tacotron-2.
3The architecture of WaveNet vocoder can be downloaded at https://github.
com/r9y9/wavenet vocoder
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Fig. 10. The average detection error rate PE as a function of payload in bits
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Fig. 11. The average detection error rate PE as a function of payload in bits
per sample (bps) for steganographic algorithm payloads ranging from 0.1-0.5
bps against D-MC.
Fig.10 and Fig.11 show the average detection error rate PE
as a function of payload in bps for steganographic algorithm
payloads ranging from 0.1-0.5 bps against CTM and D-MC.
It can be observed in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 that the PE of
AACbased decreases with the increment of payload and turns
to be nearly 0%, and that of LSB matching is always nearly
0%, showing that the steganalysis is effective with respect to
the generated audio. Accordingly, PE of the proposed scheme
is nearly 50%, which means the proposed scheme is nearly
perfectly secure. The experimental results verify the security
performance as proved in Section IV-D.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we first review the provably secure steganog-
raphy, which has two main frameworks: black-box sampling
based stegosystem and compression based stegosystem, and
conclude the limitation of current work: lack of efficient
perfect sampler and cannot model the explicit distribution
of natural media. However, the fast development of genera-
tive models brings great opportunity to the provably secure
steganography.
Based on generative models without explicit distribution
(GAN, VAE, flow-based models), we design block-box sam-
pling based stegosystems. As for GAN/VAE, the generator
in GAN and decoder in VAE serve as the perfect sampler,
respectively. A message mapping module transfers the mes-
sage into the latent vector, and then the latent vector will
be fed to the perfect sampler to produce the stego. An extra
extractor network should be trained to extract message. As
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for flow-based generative model, the generative network can
serve as both message embedder and extractor, resulting from
its reversible structure. It can be easily found that the flow-
based generative models show great convenience in designing
stegosystem, for there is no need for an extra extractor.
For generative models with explicit distribution (autore-
gressive models), we design compression based stegosystems.
Given the distribution of generative media, combining with
source coding, we can decompress the message into generative
media. The receivers can compress the generative media to
extract message.
Take DFC-VAE, Glow, WaveNet as instances, the asymp-
totically perfectly secure performance is verified by the state-
of-the-art steganalysis methods. Additionally, the theoretical
proof is given for WaveNet stegosystem using Arithmetic
coding.
In our future work, we will explore other effective source
encoding schemes and try to transfer them to generative
steganographic encoding. Furthermore, other generative me-
dia, such as text and video, will be developed under the
proposed framework.
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Appendix
Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 give the pseudo codes of
message embedding and extraction, respectively.
Algorithm 3 Message embedding using AAD
Require: The random message m, the probability distribution
P = {P(a1), P(a2), ..., P(an)}, and the cumulative probabil-
ity F (ai) =
∑i
k=1 P (ak)
Ensure: The stego sequence s.
1: convert the random message bits m1m2m3...mn into a
fraction q using
m1m2m3...mL → q = 0.m1m2m3...mL =
L∑
i=1
mi · 2−i. (33)
2: h0 = 1, l0 = 0, k = 0
3: while q + 0.5k > hk & q − 0.5k ≤ lk do
4: k = k + 1
5: subdivide the interval [lk−1, hk−1) into subintervals of
length proportional to the probability P of the symbols
in cover in the predefined order. The probability P will
be updated when generating next audio sample.
6: take the symbol a j corresponding to the subinterval in
which q lies.
7: s = s :: a j
8: hk = lk−1 + (hk−1 − lk−1) ∗ F(a j).
9: lk = lk−1 + (hk−1 − lk−1) ∗ F(a j−1).
10: end while
11: output = s
Algorithm 4 Message extraction using AAE
Require: The stego sequence s, the probability distribution P,
the message length n and the CDF F.
Ensure: The message m.
1: h0 = 1
2: l0 = 0
3: k = 0
4: while hk ≤ 2n do
5: k = k + 1
6: subdivide the interval [lk−1, lk−1 +hk−1) into subintervals
of length proportional to the probabilities P of the sym-
bols in cover (in the predefined order). The probability
P will be updated when generating next audio sample.
7: hk = lk−1 + (hk−1 − lk−1) ∗ F(a j).
8: lk = lk−1 + (hk−1 − lk−1) ∗ F(a j−1).
9: end while
10: find the fraction q =
∑n
i=1 mi2
−i satisfying ln ≤ q ≤ hn,
where mi ∈ {0, 1} is the message bit.
11: output = m = [m1,m2,m3, ...mn]
